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Abstract 
We focus on the extent of information-driven trading originating from order flows to 
capture the behavior of the market makers on an emerging market. We modified the clas-
sical Easley et al. (1996) model for the probability of informed trading using a jackknife 
approach in which trades of one particular market maker at a time are left out from 
the sum of all buys and sells. Using the estimates from the jackknife approach, for each 
market maker we test whether the order flows associated with the particular market 
maker behaved significantly differently from the others. Data from the Prague Stock 
Exchange SPAD trading platform are used to demonstrate our methodology. Finding 
significant differences in the probability of informed trading computed from order flows, 
we conclude that order flows could reveal the extent of information-driven trading and 
could potentially be used by regulatory authorities to identify suspicious behavior by 
market participants. 
1. Introduction 
A significant number of studies deal with the issue of insider or informed trad-
ing on developed and emerging markets. Starting with the seminal work of Kyle (1985), 
various models were developed for insider or informed trading and many empirical 
studies attempted to estimate the severity of this problem. Insider trading can be de-
scribed as a situation where the investor is trading based on private information that 
is available only to a restricted number of people. Although insider trading is illegal 
in many countries, the boundary between insider trading and informed trading is not 
as obvious as it may look.
1  
To measure the probability of information-driven trading (PIN) Easley et al. 
(1996) developed a model commonly used in the literature to estimate PIN that is 
based on the imbalance of buy and sell order flows. Note that PIN is not exclusively 
an insider trading measure, as it also captures informed trading by investors who are 
particularly skillful in analyzing public news. It has been shown, for example, by Vega 
(2006) that the estimated PIN was actually higher after company reports become 
publicly available. There are two main sources of information: information from firm 
* The authors would like to thank Jan Bena, Randall Filer, Evžen Kočenda, and seminar and conference par-
ticipants at Philadelphia, Milan, New York, FMA, and MME. GAČR grant (403/11/0020, Hanousek) and
Global Development Network grant (Kopřiva) support are gratefully acknowledged. The views expres-
sed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of any of the affiliated institutions. 
1 While there is a broad consensus that trading on knowledge of, for example, company profits or dis-
closures is considered insider trading, there is not a similar consensus for trading connected with the exe-
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fundamentals (including information on mergers and acquisitions) and informa- 
tion from order flows. PIN may also be affected by large institutional orders, as their 
presence may have a substantial impact on market microstructure and the price of  
the asset, particularly on a small emerging market like the Czech Republic. Overall, 
the extent of information-driven trading considerably affects the credibility of a given 
financial market, as it also increases the cost of acquiring information on the appro-
priate timing of a trade.  
In the Easley et al. (1996) framework, informed traders act non-strategically 
and trade upon their inside information. However, informed traders often try to hide 
their information and react dynamically to the behavior of other market participants, 
naturally preferring a trading environment with a high degree of anonymity (see Barc-
lay et al., 2003; Anand et al., 2005; Boehmer, 2005; Lee and Yi, 2001; and Brunner-
meier and Pederssen, 2005, among others). Hence, an electronic dealers market is 
an ideal platform for executing informed trades (see also Sherwood, 1997).  
Obviously, trades using private information would be not negligible in size. 
Let us reiterate that the associated PIN is not necessarily an insider measure, as it 
could also reflect large institutional orders. Typically, on a dealers market large institu-
tional traders cannot hide their orders and as a result would cooperate with a chosen 
dealer, therefore sharing information about the total order limits (volume and price). 
Let us note that the execution of such orders is highly dependent upon the particular 
market microstructure. The current literature does not identify the possibility of col-
lusion between market makers and informed traders. Nevertheless, the particular 
market microstructure may stimulate investors who are executing large trades to 
share their private information with a particular market maker (MM). This is the case 
in the Czech Republic.  
In the present paper we use the dealers market (SPAD) of the leading segment  
of the Prague Stock Exchange, since we believe that the market microstructure of 
the SPAD trading system might induce collusion between dealers and large institutional 
investors. In particular, MMs and large investors would share private information and 
therefore the order flows coming from a given MM may become a significant source 
and determinant of information-driven trading on small emerging markets.
2  
The Czech capital market microstructure allows investors to place limit orders 
only on a dealers market, whose trading lots are typically of a small size. Further, as 
the whole market is quite thin, any large order has a significant impact on the price of 
the underlying asset. Obviously, executing a large trade through market orders by hit-
ting the quotes of MMs would end up with immense trading costs, as even a few 
consecutive orders in the same direction would substantially affect the price. While 
in practice the use of private information could proceed on several fronts, large insti-
tutional orders are probably done via one trading channel, i.e., by using one MM. 
The fast use of private information may lead to a situation where several MMs are 
informed, investors do not behave strategically, and information is quickly captured 
by the market. On the other hand, large institutional orders could lead to strategic be-
havior by the MM, especially on a small market or when liquidity is not large enough. 
2 For example there are publicly known cases where the government of the Czech Republic was selling
shares of the energy company CEZ. During a process such as this, one can assume that either the govern-
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To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the extent of 
order-flow information-driven trading initiated at the level of MMs. We develop 
a methodology based on the Easley et al. (1996) model to be able to detect suspicious 
trading behavior by particular MMs on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). By an in-
novative combination of PIN measurement and a jackknife approach we leave out 
the trades of one particular MM at a time from the sum of all buys and sells. We then 
test the hypothesis that due to private information about a large block order the MM 
behaved significantly different from the other MMs, using the estimates from the jack-
knife approach. Finding significant differences in the behavior of Czech MMs we 
conclude that contrary to previous studies MMs may not only screen out large in-
formed traders but on less regulated emerging markets they greatly affect the extent 
of information-driven trading coming from order flows by sharing private informa-
tion with key large customers. Therefore, our methodology could significantly con-
tribute to the detection mechanisms of order-flow patterns which could be used by 
other investors as well as regulatory authorities. Our results also contribute to the cur-
rent debate about market microstructure and its effect on large and small investors.  
2. Literature Review 
Whenever we talk about informed investors we should distinguish two cases: 
1. investors possessing private information originating in firm fundamentals and 
2.  investors (brokers) accessing information about large institutional orders. Both 
cases lead to an increase in order flow imbalance, but as mentioned above the second 
case would probably involve more strategic behavior of the MM. In addition, the sec-
ond case is interesting to study in the environment of small stock markets, since it  
is typically associated with dual trading, information advantages that could last for 
a longer period, possible stealth trading, etc. Below we will present an overview of 
the relevant literature on information-driven trading, order flows, and stealth trading 
associated with the behavior of dealers or MMs. 
The first stream of literature deals with the problem of whether dual traders 
are informed or not and how they proceed with large orders. Most of the theoretical 
studies start with the assumption that dual traders are informed traders and then inves-
tigate the effect of their trading strategies (see Roell, 1990, and Sarkar, 1995, among 
others). Empirical results for developed markets are inconclusive; for example, Fish-
man and Longstaff (1992) viewed dual trading brokers at the Chicago Board of Trade 
as informed, while Chakravarty and Li (2003), when controlling for the overall trad-
ing profit, suggested that dual traders are uninformed.
3 Nevertheless, an overall view 
of the literature suggests that MMs or dealers might anticipate private information 
from the order flow. In addition, informed traders might achieve a more favorable 
price by breaking up their large orders into multiple medium-sized trades (a so-called 
“stealth trading” practice; see Barclay and Warner, 1993, for the first reference).
4 
The results, however, may vary across different market microstructures; for example, 
in a  pure limit order market (the Stock Exchange of Thailand) informed traders use 
3 The difference between these studies could be associated with the different level of regulation: the earlier
study is based on data over a period just before the FBI launched a federal investigation into fraudulent
trading practices on the Chicago futures exchange. 
4 For more recent results see Anand and Chakravarty (2007) and Anand et al. (2005), among others. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     207 
larger trades compared to dealership markets (Charoenwong, Ding, and Jenwittay-
aroje, 2010).  
The second stream of literature focuses on the overall information advantage 
of MMs, dealers or brokers rather than on a particular behavior such as dual trading. 
It is well known that MMs significantly facilitate price discovery compared to a pure 
auction with only public orders and that their informational advantage comes prima-
rily from the obtained order flow (e.g. Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000, and Kurov 
and Lasser, 2004). Typically, the specialists are able to generate short-term trade 
profits, mostly as a consequence of the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, in some markets 
large dealers act more as informed traders than as liquidity suppliers (see, for exam-
ple, Wang and Chae, 2003, a study on the Taiwan Stock Exchange). Since only brokers 
on the market are able to view the order flow of their customers, the informational 
advantage of the dealers on the market probably originates from the privileged po-
sition of direct access to the electronic exchange without any trading fees or trading 
delays. 
Another stream of literature is devoted to the degree of anonymity on differ-
ent markets and the associated extent of PIN. For example, comparisons of trades on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ suggest that the NYSE, as a less anonymous market, has 
a lower extent of informed trading (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003). Moreover, 
the change in listing from a dealership to an auction market (NASDAQ to NYSE or 
AMEX) leads to a significant decrease in the extent of information-driven trading. 
Therefore, either specialists on the NYSE have a better ability to identify informed 
traders, or informed investors prefer to trade on a market with a higher degree of ano-
nymity (Heidl and Huang, 2002). Similar results were obtained by Grammig et al. 
(2001) from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange via a comparison of non-anonymous floor 
trading versus anonymous electronic trading systems (IBIS and later XETRA), show-
ing that informed traders prefer to execute their orders in the anonymous environ-
ment. 
All of the above-mentioned studies assume that MMs are either using infor-
mation from the order flow to act against their customers or screening out inform- 
ed traders. In addition, the results of Hanousek and Podpiera (2002, 2004) support 
the hypothesis that MMs in an emerging market (the PSE) may share private infor-
mation with their key large customers. Furthermore, Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) 
presents more intriguing results – despite many improvements in regulation and in-
creased trading volume the extent of information-driven trading was nearly the same 
for the years 1999 and 2002. They particularly point out that the extent of informed 
trading was about the same for shares of Ceska sporitelna and Erste Bank.
5 Let us 
note that these stocks have little in common except having the same set of MMs, 
therefore, one could ask to what extent the MMs on the PSE affect the probability of 
informed trading. 
The studies reviewed above suggest that informed traders’ behavior differs ac-
cording to market microstructure and also that MMs are important participants on 
the market who are able to recognize informed traders. Several studies demonstrate 
the ability of MMs to identify informed traders and the effect this has on the proba-
5 In 2000, Ceska sporitelna (a major Czech bank) was privatized to the Austrian Erste Bank. Erste Bank,
already listed in Vienna, started dual listing on the PSE in October 2002. 208                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
bility of information-driven trading. They conclude that a  higher degree of ano-
nymity is associated with a higher probability of information-driven trading, and that 
informed and insider trading is a widespread practice in emerging financial markets. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Easley et al. (1996) Model 
Our model is based on the well-known framework developed by Easley et al. 
(1996). Let us first shortly review their model and then introduce our extension. In all 
steps of our model, as well as any empirical estimation, we control for the order flow 
size by assuming/using a regular lot as a trading unit.  
There exist three types of agents on the market: uninformed (noisy) traders, in-
formed traders, and MMs. Trading is divided into n separate trading days. See Figure 1 
for a tree diagram of the trading day.  
Before each day an information event might occur. An information event is 
defined as the occurrence of a signal s about the value of the asset. The probability 
that a signal occurs is α, and if a signal occurs, it takes on two possible values: low 
with probability δ and high with probability 1- δ.
6 If a signal occurs, some fraction of 
the traders receive the signal. If no signal occurs, all traders stay uninformed.  
Using the scheme of Figure 1 we can express the probability of observing 
a given number of buys and sells as  
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where S is the number of sells and B the number of buys. The first part of expres- 
sion (1) denotes a no event day, the second part a bad event day and the third part 
a  good event day. According to the  assumptions of the  model the  days are inde-
pendent and therefore the probability of observing a series of days with a given sum 
of buys and sells for each day is a product of the probability for the individual days. 
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The parameter θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) is then estimated using the maximum likelihood 
method.
7 The probability of information-driven trading is the chance that an MM will 
trade with the informed trader and therefore can be computed as the ratio of the ar-
rival rate of informed traders to the arrival rate of all traders: 
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6 In the case of a bad signal the value of the asset is V , for a good signal V  and for no signal unchanged.  
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Figure 1  Trading Tree Diagram  
                          
Note: This diagram depicts the structure of arriving buy and sell orders during a trading day, where α is 
the probability of the information event occurring, δ is the probability of bad news, μ is the arrival rate of 
informed traders and ε is the arrival rate of uninformed traders. 
 
This is actually the conditional probability of an information-driven trade given 
the occurrence of a trade at the beginning of a trading day. Therefore, the numerator 
is the product of the probability of an information event times the arrival rate of in-
formed traders. The denominator is then the probability of the occurrence of a trade, 
which is the probability of an incoming informed trader plus the probability of an in-
coming uninformed buyer and seller. 
3.2 Large Block Trades and Informed MMs  
Our extension of the  original model reflects the  characteristics of a  quote- 
-driven market with a relatively small number of market makers. These market makers 
also usually act as brokers. As on every market there are also various types of in-
vestors. We roughly divide them into two groups: large (institutional) investors and 
small (retail) investors. As these types of investors often have different needs, the mar-
ket makers (brokers) are specialized on various types of investors or have at least 
a different approach to these investors. Small investors often open an account at just 
one broker and either use online trading systems to execute their orders by hitting 
the quotes posted by market makers or use some of the brokerage services. Never-
theless, large investors have specific needs in order to execute their large orders, as 
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Large investors are therefore insiders, as they possess valuable private infor-
mation (coming from the order flow), which has a significant effect on the price of 
the asset (Chakravarty, 2001, and Golec, 2007, among others). According to their size, 
they are the key customers for the brokers. Therefore, they may get special brokerage 
services and the fees for executing orders may differ significantly from those charged 
to retail customers. According to Schwartz and Shapiro (1992), institutional investors 
accounted for 72% of the share volume on the New York Stock Exchange. Accord-
ing to the relatively low number of retail investors in the Czech Republic, this per-
centage might be significantly higher. 
At some markets the problem of the different needs of different types of in-
vestors and the  potential problem of better-informed large investors with a  large 
impact on prices is solved by an upstairs market (Golec, 2007). However, similar to 
the  market microstructure of the  Czech capital market, in our model there is no 
upstairs market for large orders. Similar to the existing literature on stealth trading, 
we expect that large orders are usually broken into medium-size trades. As large in-
vestors face a decision how to optimize the execution costs of their orders, using 
market orders (similar to small investors) to execute large trades is not usually suit-
able for them due to the large impact on the price and therefore the large execution 
costs. Thus, large investors may often prefer passive trading strategies, i.e., using 
limit orders. Nevertheless, on the quote-driven market only market makers may place 
limit orders (quotes). Therefore, large investors are forced to seek lower execution costs 
by negotiating with market makers. In other words, while optimizing the execution 
costs of their orders, large investors are in our model forced to negotiate with market 
makers about the possible execution of the orders and market makers may also use 
market making activities in order to execute these orders. That is, there is latitude for 
collusion or large investors could be forced to cooperate and share their information 
with the MM. Some of these facts are also mentioned, for example, by Keim and 
Madhavan (1995), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), and Golec (2007), confirming that 
larger trades take several days to execute. 
Such implementation of large trade orders has a higher chance to minimize 
the impact on the stock price; practically it means that the MM trades against his 
account and once he secures the deal (accumulates or sells shares) then a block trade 
with his client closes the trade. As this scenario is in fact using the market maker’s 
activities to hide the large trade, it is not rational for the large investor to contact 
more than one market maker/broker, as it would just spread the information about 
an incoming large order. Therefore, at the beginning of the execution of his large or-
der, the large investor chooses a trading channel, meaning he chooses a market maker, 
which we can distinguish in our dataset. In other words, the MM has an incentive to 
act strategically in that he is trying to choose the optimal timing of several trades to 
process the whole big order at the best possible price.
8  
Our model, therefore, consists of two types of private information. The first 
one is the private signal in the Easley et al. (1996) model: short-lived information 
about the underlying asset that is available to a relatively large number of informed 
8 However, we do not expect that he is necessarily trying to manipulate the price or abusing the market
illegally. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     211 
investors. Similar to Keim and Madhavan (1995), we assume that in such a situation 
investors prefer market orders and execute their trades as quickly as possible. In 
other words they do not act strategically and come to the market according to the pri-
vate information they received. The second type of private information in our model 
comes from the order flow. Information about the incoming large order is available 
only to the  large investor and the  market maker with whom the  large investor is 
negotiating about the optimal execution of the trade. Similar to Keim and Madhavan 
(1995), we assume that an investor who possesses longer-term private information 
that is available only to a restricted number of people prefers to trade more discreetly, 
negotiating with some of the market makers on the preferable execution of the trade. 
Also, large orders executed through market orders have large price impacts and, there-
fore, using limit orders may significantly reduce the execution costs of the trade. 
Keim and Madahavan (1995) argue that the benefits from a passive trading strategy 
(limit orders) should be largest on thin markets where liquidity is low. Their anal-
ysis of the data on the equity transactions of 21 institutions shows that the execu-
tion time of trades is longer than one day: on average 1.65 to 1.80 days. However, 
this might be significantly higher for the Czech Republic. As pointed out above, 
the institutional investor often just announces the number of shares and the side of 
the trade and the  broker then tries to execute the  order with the lowest possible 
execution costs. 
The first type of information flows to the market through market orders and 
therefore its revelation is not affected by the behavior of particular market makers. 
On the other hand, the large investor, when optimizing his execution cost, chooses 
one of the market makers/brokers, who is then executing his order and therefore has 
other incentives than to balance his portfolio. In such a situation we in fact have two 
types of MMs: informed and uninformed.  
Suppose that there is other information affecting the price of an asset: infor-
mation about a large order that is independent of the above private signal of informed 
investors and that lasts for several trading days. In such a situation the large inves- 
tor will contact just one MM, as otherwise he would be spreading the information to 
the other participants of the market, which could increase the execution costs of 
the trade. Therefore, we assume that only one informed MM has private information 
about this large order coming on the market from one of his clients. The large order 
consists of a random volume of shares and a random length K of trading days. Note 
that the actual number of days and the total number of shares can be limited by 
the price ceiling imposed by the client or/and by a particular deadline.
9 As confirmed 
by several brokers, the typical practice is that a large order is inspected at the end of 
the trading session and new limits are set for the next day(s) or the execution of 
the order is stopped. In such a situation only one MM will have detailed information 
about the large order – private information. If more than one MM receives informa-
tion about the large order and if the MMs do not act in consonance with each other, 
the order will be revealed to the whole market and the new value of the asset will be 
revealed immediately by the competitive behavior of two or more informed MMs.
10  
9 Even though block trades must be reported in 5 minutes in the open session and in 60 minutes in the closed
session, the behavior of MMs suggests that they are either aware of the block trade in advance or set
the block trade ex-post.  212                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
If the MM is informed, we assume that he does not set quotes in a way that 
will immediately reveal his information about the order. Therefore, in the case of 
a large buy order the informed MM will just try to have the best quote
11 – he will 
post his quotes for buys more actively and thereby end up with the best quote with 
a higher probability than the uninformed MM. Although the other MMs may anti-
cipate the existence of the large order, they do not know the exact information of 
the trade, i.e., the limit price and the execution deadline. This is the key information 
for the other market participants to be able to use such information to actively post 
quotes for buys and compete with the informed MM. Without this information, there 
is the risk that the MM will immediately stop the execution of the trade and the price 
will return to its initial level.  
Further, the uninformed MMs might also find it difficult to compete with 
the price setting of the informed market maker, as they do not possess the inventory 
advantage of the informed MM. The uninformed MMs without inside information 
about the large order will try to avoid risky unbalanced positions and therefore will 
post quotes such that they would finish with somewhat balanced inventories. On 
the other hand, the informed MMs, contingent on their information, might venture 
more risky positions from the point of view of uninformed MMs and therefore might 
be able to afford to actively quote only buys or sells. The uninformed MMs generate 
profit from the trading fees and spread. However, the informed MM generates profit 
also from proprietary trading. Thus he may force the other MMs either to accept a lower 
spread and thus lower trading profits or to give up market making activities for the par-
ticular stock. For the other investors it is also quite hard to trade upon just part of 
the information – the information that one of the market makers might be executing 
a large order – as they would face the spread costs while trading with only this incom-
plete information. They could, however, use such information to postpone the exe-
cution of their trade.  
Therefore, such a situation will probably end up such that the informed MM 
uses his market making activities to execute the trade and thus will probably have 
a different balance of mandatory buys and sells than the rest of the market makers. 
Although the  other market participants might be aware of the  presence of a  large 
order it could be difficult to use this information in the current trading system. Since 
the uninformed market makers have limited resources and therefore have to balance 
their inventory position it is really hard for them to compete with the informed mar-
ket maker. If an uninformed MM would like to trade using this information he would 
face the risk that the large investor will stop selling the share. Here it should be 
stressed again that, as confirmed by several brokers, the  typical practice is that 
the large order is inspected at the end of the trading session and new limits are set for 
the next day(s). It is this – the limited access to the limit orders of all investors, unin-
formed market makers with limited capital who raise money mostly from the spread, 
the non-existent upstairs market, and the possibility of non-transparent pseudo block 
trades that move from block trades into the SPAD segment – that makes the market 
 
10 Given the trading environment (a dealers’ market) we expect a relatively low number of market makers,
therefore, due to the competition of two or more informed market makers, we expect that the information
about the large order will be revealed quite quickly.  
11 The best buy and best sell quotes from all the market maker’s quotes. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     213 
Table 1  Total Traded Volume and Mandatory Trades, Czech Government Selling 
Shares of CEZ 
Time Span  Total Volume 
(bil. CZK)  Mandatory Trades 
Sep 07–Aug 08  373.9 
                   76.6 
148.8 
                   72.2 
Note: In the Mandatory Trades column, the main number is the overall volume while the number in the upper 
right corner is the mandatory buy volume and the number in the lower right corner is the mandatory sell 
volume.  
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations 
 
microstructure really messy and enables some market makers to use their market 
making activities to cover the information stemming from large trades. 
Overall, since the major source of the income of an MM is generated by 
the  spread between the  bid and ask prices, the  situation of an  existing large trade 
conducted via a specific MM could lead to 1. collusion, 2. the other MMs’ spreads 
being close to their marginal costs, and/or 3. other MMs stopping trading. The in-
formed MM, on the other hand, will trade actively only on one side (buy or sell), 
according to his private information. By and large it leads to a market with lower 
competition and large latitude for price manipulation.  
To illustrate the situation let us focus on the particular example of a publicly 
known case of the Czech government selling shares of the energy company CEZ. 
The  publicly available information was that the  Czech government started selling 
nearly 7% of the shares in September 2007 and stopped selling the shares due to 
the upcoming financial crises by September 2008. One of the commissioners helping 
the Czech government with the execution of the trade was MM4.
12 The overall vol-
ume of the trade was around CZK 34 billion, i.e., 9% of the total volume traded dur-
ing September 2007 to September 2008 (see Table 1). By comparing the trading 
volumes by category one can speculate that only a part of the governmental deal was 
conducted through mandatory trades; most of trades during this period probably used 
the MM4 quotes as an indication of the limit orders of the Czech government.  
Further, the fact that during this period the percentage of the market share of 
MM4 increased to 18% (overall 13% for CEZ) supports our hypothesis that the in-
ventory advantage and the detailed private information about large orders give the in-
formed MM the opportunity to trade more actively and end up with an unbalanced 
inventory position (see Table 2). The execution of the trade ended with the first large 
price jump in September 2008, which also supports the notion that a large order is 
inspected at the end of the trading session and stopped when the price changes sig-
nificantly. If any uninformed MM would like to trade using the publicly available 
information that the  Czech government is going to sell the  shares he would face 
the risk that MM4 will stop selling the share. This is probably the case we see in 
the behavior of the market makers as the governmental deal was conducted, since 
the price remained constant for nearly the whole period. MM4 appeared significantly 
 
12 We decided to code all the market makers in order to minimize possible bias while executing all com-
putations and analysis. The coding of market makers is available upon request. 214                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
Table 2  Mandatory Trades of Particular Mms, Czech Government Selling  
Shares of CEZ  
MM  MM1 MM2 MM4 MM5 MM6 MM7 MM9  MM10  MM11 
From Sep 07  
to Aug 08 
 9.7  6.4  18.3  5.5  8.5  11.1  6.0  7.0   4.2 
  1.8    0.6    10.4    0.1    -0.8    -3.8    0.5    -4.5    0.0 
 7.8  5.8  7.9  5.3  9.3  14.9  5.5 11.5   4.2 
Note: In each column the main number represents the difference between mandatory buy and mandatory sell 
volume while the number in the upper right corner is the mandatory buy volume and the number in 
the lower right corner is the mandatory sell volume. 
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations 
 
more on the quotes for buys (market maker selling the asset) and MM7 and MM10 
(large market makers) appeared mostly on the quotes for sells (market maker buying 
the asset).  
3.3 Estimation Procedure 
To estimate the extent of information-driven trading due to large orders or, in 
other words, due to informed MMs, first we run the estimations for the whole sum of 
buys and sells. Further, to estimate the PIN originating from large orders or other 
private information of the MMs we propose a procedure to estimate the PIN with and 
without the trades of informed MMs. Therefore, step by step we exclude each MM’s 
trades from the sum of buys and sells and estimate the model. Having all the para-
meters θi = (αi, δi, εi, μi) estimated for each MM we then test whether PIN using 
the estimated parameters θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) and PIN without considering the trades of 
a given MM are significantly different.  
Having identified the informed MMs we can estimate the effect of the large 
orders on the probability of information-driven trading: 






αμε α μ ε
=−
++
                                   (4) 
where θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) are the estimated parameters from the classic Easley et al. 
(1996) model using the sum of all buys and sells for each day and θi = (αi, δi, εi, μi) 
are the estimated parameters using the sum of all buys and sells for each day without 
the trades of a given identified informed MM. We have made the same set of assump-
tions as Easley at al. (1996); in particular, we assume independence of information 










 would have 
asymptotically normal distributions and obviously the estimators of both parts would 
be (positively) correlated.
13 In order to get the standard error of (4) we use a cluster 
modification of the sandwich estimator as proposed by Rogers (1993) to estimate 










. Non-technically speaking, 
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MM (equation 4) is therefore the  difference between the  probability of informed 
trading with and without the trades of the informed MM. 
4. Data 
For our analysis, we use intra-day data from the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) 
SPAD trading system for all stocks traded from January 1, 2003 to August 31, 2010, 
publicly available online.
14 SPAD was founded in 1998 to increase the liquidity of 
the market. The trading system is designed as a dealers market with at least three 
MMs for each stock, who are required to quote ask and bid prices for a standardized 
number of shares with a limited maximum possible spread for each stock. If a given 
quote is the best available on the market the particular MM is obliged to trade on 
the posted quote for a buy or sell. 
Each trading day is divided into two phases, open and closed. The  actual 
trading occurs during the open phase of the system, from 9.15 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. each 
trading day. We use data on all SPAD trades during the sample time period. Each 
trade record in our database consists of security identification, date, time, type of 
trade, and price, and for the standard SPAD trades also the identification of the MM 
who traded it. We are also able to identify cross trades and trades conducted between 
the inventory of the MM and the MM’s client. Even though akcie.cz provides quite 
detailed information about trades, still a significant proportion are not transparent, as 
mandatory trades account for only around 40% of the total traded volume. Despite 
the increased regulation of block trades these trades probably just moved from the seg-
ment of block trades into the non-transparent segment of SPAD trades with no iden-
tification. The  key feature of our dataset is that we are able to identify not only 
whether the given trade was buyer- or seller-initiated, but also which MM was on 
which side of the trade.  
The sample period consists of 1925 trading days and we focus on 15 com-
panies traded during the  period (see Table 3a  and  3b for descriptive statistics of 
market capitalization and traded volumes; KIT DIGITAL was traded only for a short 
period in our dataset).
15 We have eleven MMs in our sample period: six brokerage 
 
13 One can get this statement implicitly from previous studies, as for testing PIN all authors used t-ratios
and underlying t-tests. Also, the assumption of independence of information arrival ensures that the first
and second terms of (4) represent certain conditional probabilities; for example, the first term is actually
the conditional probability of an information-driven trade given the occurrence of a trade at the beginning
of a trading day. Therefore, such conditional probabilities can also be computed as the means of some
number of buys or sells satisfying certain conditions. Since we assume independence of buy and sell orders,
any (artificial) mean using functions of the number of buy and sell orders would satisfy the CLT and there-
fore we would get asymptotic normality of PIN.  
14 Available at www.akcie.cz. The last access for this paper was on 30 September 2010.  
15 Let us note that only six of them were traded during the whole period: two banks (Erste Bank and Ko-
mercni banka), a petrochemical company (Unipetrol), an electricity producer (CEZ), a telecommunications
company (Telefonica O2), and a cigarette producer (Philip Morris). Another telecommunications company
(Ceske Radiokomunikace) was removed from the market in September 2004. One IPO, Zentiva, was intro-
duced to the market in June 2004 and removed from the market in April 2009. In February 2005 a real
estate company (ORCO), already listed in Paris, started dual listing on the PSE and in June 2005 a media
company (CME), already traded on NASDAQ for over 10 years, started dual trading on the PSE. ECM (a real
estate company) and PEGAS (a synthetic nonwoven textiles producer) were introduced in December 2006,
AAA (a car reseller) in September 2007, NWR (a coal mining company) in 2008, and VIG (an insurance
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Table 3a  Market Capitalization and Overall Traded Volumes 







trades  APD B/S  Price  Price 
change  MM 
AAA 2007 3  22%  0.93 0.34  14.4  0.89  44.4  na  7 
   2008  1  75%  0.94  0.61  13.2  0.82  9.1  -80%  7 
   2009  1  13%  1.00  0.90  7.8  0.92  13.5  49%  6 
CME 2005 43  14%  0.81 0.56  18.3  1.30 1,409 18%  6 
   2006  50  50%  0.96  0.64  42.2  1.05  1,462  4%  6 
   2007  72  44%  0.99  0.68  44.3  1.12  2,106  44%  6 
   2008  14  130%  0.98  0.52  29.0  0.85  382  -82%  6 
   2009  25  69%  0.99  0.60  71.0  0.99  446  17%  6 
CEZ 2003  86  51%  0.64 0.31  18.4  1.10  146  58%  10 
   2004  202  54%  0.73  0.42  42.0  1.30  341  134%  9 
   2005  436  69%  0.68  0.45  124.5  1.00  736  116%  10 
   2006  569  61%  0.94  0.48  157.8  0.96  960  30%  9 
   2007  807  50%  0.98  0.44  119.1  1.02  1,362  42%  9 
   2008  465  83%  0.99  0.44  110.9  0.93  785  -42%  9 
   2009  465  44%  1.00  0.41  66.5  0.99  864  10%  9 
CRA 2003  11  45%  0.72 0.25 5.3  2.00  345  83%  8 
   2004  14  67%  0.61  0.29  9.8  1.10  444  29%  8 
ECM 2006  5  50%  0.99 0.53  84.4  1.51 1,432 na  6 
    2007  5  351%  0.99  0.60  44.7  0.95 1,203 -16%  6 
   2008  2  285%  0.98  0.51  25.0  0.61  261  -78%  7 
   2009  2  26%  0.98  0.80  8.2  1.05  308  18%  7 
EB 2003  191  7%  0.78  0.61  17.4  1.20  798  59%  6 
   2004  287  11%  0.85  0.63  31.6  1.20  1,187  49%  6 
   2005  334  14%  0.83  0.63  43.5  1.00  1,372  16%  8 
   2006  505  12%  0.94  0.66  54.0  1.05  1,601  17%  9 
    2007  411  25%  0.99  0.71  92.5  0.94 1,301 -19%  9 
   2008  133  68%  1.00  0.65  114.6  0.94  419  -68%  9 
   2009  264  22%  0.99  0.62  100.4  1.01  699  67%  9 
KB 2003  92  110%  0.65  0.40  38.0  1.00  2,418  16%  9 
   2004  124  120%  0.60  0.34  61.1  1.00  3,272  35%  9 
   2005  131  158%  0.64  0.43  95.1  0.90  3,441  5%  10 
    2006  118  90%  0.94  0.57  68.8  0.92 3,099 -10%  9 
   2007  166  82%  0.99  0.57  76.2  1.13  4,371  41%  8 
    2008  113  102%  0.99  0.59  100.7  0.97 2,970 -32%  7 
   2009  149  42%  0.99  0.50  74.3  1.06  3,929  32%  6 
Notes: Mkt. cap. is Market capitalization in billions of CZK at the end of the year; Turnover is the turnover ratio 
during the year as a percentage of Mkt. cap.; SPAD trades is the ratio of the SPAD traded volume on 
overall traded volume; Sys. Trades is the ratio of system trades (usually classic trades with an iden-
tification of the market maker) to the overall traded volume; APD is the average number of trades 
during a trading day; B/S is the buy over sells ratio; Price is the price at the end of the year; Price 
change is the percentage change of the price during the year; MM is the id number of the MM.  
Sources: PSE fact books, www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     217 
Table 3b  Market Capitalization and Overall Traded Volumes 







trades  APD B/S  Price  Price 
change  MM 
NWR 2008  19  229% 1.00  0.59  101.1  0.90  73  na  7 
   2009  43  64%  0.99  0.65  87.2  1.02  162  120%  7 
O2 2003  94  69%  0.49  0.17  22.5  1.20  291  19%  10 
   2004  119  102%  0.52  0.16  35.9  1.20  369  27%  9 
   2005  169  171%  0.44  0.14  43.0  1.00  525  42%  10 
   2006  153  64%  0.88  0.41  62.8  0.92  476  -9%  10 
   2007  175  58%  0.99  0.40  51.4  1.13  545  14%  10 
   2008  137  68%  0.99  0.38  52.3  0.91  424  -22%  10 
   2009  135  49%  0.99  0.40  38.6  1.01  418  -1%  10 
ORCO  2005  na  na  0.78 0.61 18.8  1.10 1,809 41% 6 
    2006  22 125%  0.96 0.76 65.1  1.09 2,755 52% 6 
    2007  23 159%  0.99 0.64 54.9  0.87 2,165  -21% 8 
   2008  2  630%  1.00  0.64  52.5  0.79  173  -92%  8 
   2009  2  109%  1.00  0.74  34.0  1.06  170  -1%  8 
PM  2003  30  64%  0.67 0.38  9.1  1.20  15,728 41% 9 
   2004  32  91%  0.72  0.41  22.2  1.10  16,776  7%  8 
   2005  35  101%  0.68  0.43  28.2  1.20  18,251  9%  8 
   2006  21  89%  0.93  0.46  23.4  0.92  10,840  -41%  7 
    2007  15  62%  0.99 0.47 16.0  1.08 7,933  -27% 7 
    2008  12  42%  0.94 0.38 10.1  0.92 6,026  -24% 7 
    2009  17  30%  0.94 0.39  9.1  1.03 8,796 46% 7 
PEGAS 2006  7  48%  0.99  0.35  93.3 0.91  753  na  7 
   2007  7  231%  0.95  0.48  35.0  0.93  751  0%  8 
   2008  2  237%  0.97  0.57  21.9  0.78  233  -69%  8 
   2009  4  71%  0.95  0.51  12.0  1.19  445  91%  8 
UNI 2003  12  72%  0.60  0.34  8.2  1.30  66  92%  8 
   2004  18  79%  0.68  0.35  9.5  1.00  98  48%  8 
   2005  42  122%  0.78  0.54  45.1  1.00  233  138%  8 
   2006  42  114%  0.95  0.59  47.2  1.01  234  0%  6 
   2007  61  75%  0.88  0.55  33.3  1.05  338  44%  7 
   2008  27  105%  0.98  0.60  28.0  0.90  150  -56%  7 
   2009  25  54%  0.98  0.53  17.7  1.11  140  -7%  7 
VIG 2008  83 2%  1.00  0.76  11.6  0.84  646  na  5 
   2009  121  1%  1.00  0.79  8.3  0.98  942  46%  5 
ZEN 2004  29 59%  0.65  0.30  17.0  1.10  758  50%  8 
    2005  43 232%  0.61 0.38 48.5  1.00 1,136 50% 8 
    2006  48 222%  0.94 0.60 71.7  1.01 1,268 12% 9 
   2007  37  300%  0.99  0.54  71.5  1.00  972  -23%  9 
    2008  41 116%  0.92 0.33 28.5  1.09 1,078 11% 9 
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firms and five banks.
16 The MMs also differ in their specialization in different types 
of customer: retail vs. large institutional investors.  
As we can see from Table 4 none of the eleven MMs on SPAD had a signifi-
cantly higher market share in any of the analyzed stocks. The maximum market share 
was about 30 percent for one MM and each traded stock had at least five MMs with 
a more or less comparable market share.  
The average number of trades during a day differs significantly among the stocks 
during the sample period. Only some of the newly introduced stocks attracted the at-
tention of investors quickly and the activity of some of these new blue chips on 
the PSE was not comparable to the already established stocks. Our model assumes a sig-
nificant role of block trades as a source of information for some MMs, and the data 
seem to confirm this assumption. Block trades are defined by a limit set by the PSE 
and this limit is considerably larger than the market capitalization of the trading lots 
in SPAD. According to current regulations every block trade has to be registered with-
in 5 minutes during the open phase (9.15 a.m. to 4.00 p.m.) and within 60 minutes 
during the closed phase.  
Table 5 clearly shows that a  significant percentage of the  volume traded on 
SPAD used block trades. One can speculate that during 2003 to 2005, when there was 
a high percentage, the MMs who were focused on large customers also used standard 
SPAD trades to be able to gather stocks in order to execute block trades. Such MMs are 
actually informed traders and thus the  block trades may have been an  indication of 
a  high level of private information on the  PSE. Let us comment that the  significant 
decrease in the percentage of block trades in 2006 was probably caused by the increased 
regulation of MMs.
17 Despite this increased regulation, the  suspicious practices of 
unidentified block trades are still present. The forbidden unidentified block trades have 
moved to the segment of the SPAD market with no identification of the trading parties, 
leading to a situation similar to the one before 2006 (see Table 5). Therefore, trading 
practices probably remained the same, only the placement and reporting of the trades 
changed.  
SPAD was introduced to increase liquidity on the PSE. However, due to the size 
of the trading lots only medium-sized and large investors could trade in the system. 
As Table 6 demonstrates, the trading lots have varied quite a  lot, as the  prices of 
some stocks grew significantly during the sample period. For example, the smallest 
trading lot (AAA) started at CZK 0.01 million, while the largest lot was CZK 7.18 
million (CEZ).
18 Such variance in the mandatory minimum trading volume is another 
problem of the SPAD trading system as it might present obstacles for uninformed 
and smaller investors; the design of the market then attracts mostly large institutional 
and informed investors. For this reason the effect of changing the lot size can signifi-
cantly affect the extent of information-driven trading, as according to the Easley et al. 
 
16 The brokerage firms are ATLANTIK finanční trhy, a.s., BH Securities a.s., CA IB Securities, a.s., Fio,
burzovní společnost, a.s., Patria Finance, a.s., and WOOD & Company Financial Services, a.s.; the banks
are  Česká spořitelna, a.s., HVB Bank Czech Republic a.s., Raiffeisenbank a.s., ING Bank N.V., and
Komerční banka, a.s. 
17 Since early 2006, all MMs and brokers have been obligated to report their activities to the regulation
authority, including their dealings book. 
18 Using the average exchange rate against USD over the period studied (~23.7 CZK = 1 USD), the lot size
varies from USD 25,000 to USD 232,000.  
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Table 5  SPAD Traded Volume and Percentage of Block Trades 








SPAD ID  
no cross 
AAA 07-10  1.1  6%  49% 45% 42% 
CME         2005  5.9  17%  55% 26% 52% 
CME 06-10  98.8  2%  62% 36% 57% 
CEZ 03-05  445.6  30%  42% 27% 40% 
CEZ 06-10  1343.3  2%  45% 53% 42% 
CRA 03-05  14.2  32%  25% 41% 23% 
ECM 06-10  24.0  1%  58% 41% 53% 
EB 03-05  91.4  16%  62% 20% 59% 
EB 06-10  318.7  1%  67% 32% 62% 
KB 03-05  448.6  37%  39% 24% 36% 
KB 06-10  445.9  2%  56% 42% 52% 
NWR 08-10  89.5  0%  62% 37% 54% 
O2 03-05  472.4  53%  14% 32% 13% 
O2 06-10  365.1  4%  40% 56% 37% 
ORCO         2005  5.6  20%  60% 19% 56% 
ORCO 06-10  74.6 2%  68% 30% 63% 
PM 03-05  82.7  30%  39% 30% 36% 
PM 06-10  38.9  5%  44% 51% 41% 
PEGAS 06-10  25.3  4%  48% 47% 44% 
UNI 03-05  70.9  22%  45% 31% 41% 
UNI 06-10  133.9  6%  56% 37% 52% 
VIG 08-10  3.3  0%  76% 23% 69% 
ZEN 03-05  119.9  39%  35% 25% 33% 
ZEN 06-09  260.5  4%  53% 43% 50% 
Note: Volume is the traded volume on SPAD; Block trades is the percentage of the SPAD volume; SPAD with 
ID (no ID) is the percentage of SPAD traded volume with (without) an identification of the market maker; 
SPAD ID no cross is the percentage of SPAD traded volume analyzed in our study (standard SPAD 
trades through the market maker).  
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations. 
 
(1996) model informed traders are more likely to trade larger volumes. Therefore, 
regarding the significant increase of retail investors in the Czech Republic, lowering 
the lot size might attract more uninformed investors, as on SPAD the fees are signifi-
cantly lower compared to other trading channels. 
5. Results 
Trading at the PSE in general, the structure of potential investors, and the behav-
ior of MMs follow specific and significantly different patterns during the morning and 
afternoon sessions. Therefore, we decided to estimate the extent of information-driven 
trading for each session separately. Basically, new information comes to the  Czech 
capital market before the morning session and then again in the afternoon when there is 
news from U.S. capital markets. Note that only a negligible fraction of trades takes place 
between 12.00 p.m. and 2.00 p.m., and even these are mainly automatic. Therefore, we 
decided to divide each day into two main parts, the morning session from 9.15 a.m. to 
12.00 p.m. and the afternoon session from 2.00 p.m. to 4.00 p.m., to better reflect trading 
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Table 6  Changes in the Trading Lot Size 
Stock  Time period  LOT size 
Price (CZK)  Volume 
mil. CZK 
Min Max Min Max 
AAA Sep  07–Aug  10  3,000  4.8 56.5  0.01  0.17 
CME Jun  05–Aug  10  1,000  104 2317  0.10  2.32 
CEZ 
Jan 03–Oct 04  20,000  87 282  1.74  5.63 
Oct 04–Aug 05  10,000  257 552  2.57  5.52 
Aug 05–Aug 10  5,000  523 1435  2.61  7.18 
CRA Jan  03–Sep  04  3,000  180 535  0.54  1.61 
ECM Dec  06–Aug  10  500  120 2065  0.06  1.03 
EB 
Jan 03–Sep 03  500  1850 2975  0.93  1.49 
Sep 03–Mar 04  1,000  2685 3886  2.69  3.89 
Mar 04–Jul 04  500  3530 4236  1.77  2.12 
Jul 04–Aug 10  2000*  196.1* 1743*  0.39  3.49 
KB 
Jan 03–Sep 03  2,000  1817 2680  3.63  5.36 
Sep 03–Jun 08  1,000  2210 4540  2.21  4.54 
Jun 08–Aug 10  500  1520 4295  0.76  2.15 
O2 Jan  03–Aug  10  5,000  240 628  1.20  3.14 
NWR May  08–Aug  10  5,000  59 624  0.30  3.12 
ORCO Feb  05–Aug  10  500  70 3785  0.04  1.89 
PM 
Jan 03–Mar 04  200  10400 20740  2.08  4.15 
Mar 04–Aug 10  100  3650 21451  0.37  2.15 
PEGAS Dec  06–Aug  10  1,000  166 848  0.17  0.85 
UNI 
Jan 03–Feb 05  20,000  34 181  0.68  3.63 
Feb 05–Aug 10  10,000  89 346  0.89  3.46 
VIG Feb  08–Aug  10  500  400 1478  0.20  0.74 
ZEN 
Jun 04–Jun 07  3,000  480 1571  1.44  4.71 
Jun 07–Apr 09  2,000  784 1448  1.57  2.90 
Notes: LOT is the number of shares in the trading lot; Price and Volume Min (Max) is the minimum (maximum) price 
and volume in CZK during the corresponding time period.  
* indicates stock splitting.   
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations 
 
patterns and the specific nature of a small emerging market with a substantial foreign 
presence.  
For (automatic) identification purposes we first run a rolling window of 90 trad-
ing days through our sample period and for each window estimate the extent of informa-
tion-driven trading. We believe that the 90-trading day window is an optimal balance 
between the assumption of the underlying Poisson process being stationary and 
the length of the estimation moving window, which affects the precision of the esti-
mates.
19 The results are graphically presented in Figures 2 and 3. Based on the patterns 
visible in these figures, we focus on particular stocks for which the rolling window 
 
19 We have run the estimation also for shorter rolling windows, nevertheless our results suggest that that
the 90-day rolling window still satisfies the assumptions of the model, as the results are similar for
the shorter rolling windows. Detailed results are available upon request.  
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conf. lower bound conf. upper bound jackknifed PIN for MM_4  
Note: This figure represents a graphical version of the test; suspicious behavior is identified when results for 
particular MMs (thick line) exceed the limits of the confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3  Estimated PIMM for Telefonica O2 Using a 90-Day Rolling Window, 


























































conf. lower bound conf. upper bound jackknifed PIN for MM_7  
Note: This figure represents a graphical version of the test; suspicious behavior is identified when results for 
particular MMs (thick line) exceed the limits of the confidence interval. 
 
analysis suggested significantly different behavior of particular MMs. While inspect-
ing these figures, we could observe that for shares for which the PSE is the main 
market the afternoon sessions always depict higher PIN. Secondly, by the same 
token, the dual traded shares show just the opposite pattern, i.e., the morning session 
has higher PIN. Overall, possibly due to the strengthening of the regulation of MMs  
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by introducing the requirement to regularly report detailed information about their 
activities, the extent of information-driven trading decreased significantly until 2008, 
when a huge decrease of traded volume due to the financial crisis again increased 
the PIN of most of the stocks. 
Let us note that our trading data consists of precise information on whether 
the trade is a mandatory buy or mandatory sell, contrary to most of the existing 
studies.
20 Boehmer et al. (2007) point out that using only the estimation of whether 
the trade is buyer- or seller-initiated leads to downward-biased PIN estimates and 
that the magnitude of the bias is related to the security’s trading intensity. This may 
partly explain the difference in our results compared to the results of Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2004), as they used data for the whole day and estimated whether the trade 
was buyer- or seller-initiated using Lee and Ready (1991)’s methodology. Hanousek 
and Podpiera (2004) concluded that during 1999–2002 they did not see any improve-
ment in the extent of information-driven trading. Nevertheless, our results suggest 
that all the blue chips experienced a significant decrease in PIN during 2003–2006.  
In Tables 7a and 7b we present the results of tests for the time periods and 
stocks identified in the automatic identification phase described above. Overall, our 
results suggest that during our sample period there were several MMs who behaved 
significantly different from the rest of the group.
21 Nevertheless, rejecting the null 
hypothesis of equality of the estimates means that the MM has a considerable im-
balance between his mandatory sells and buys and his behavior differs from the behav-
ior of other MMs during the  particular time period. PIMM tests how different is 
the  average trade imbalance of buys and sells of a  particular market maker from 
the average trade imbalance of buys and sells on the market as a whole. By taking 
a different position on the balance of buys and sells the market maker is possibly 
hiding some relevant information from the market or is executing a large block order 
for its customer. 
The second columns of Tables 7a and 7b show the identified time period for 
the particular stock. To demonstrate the practical use of the method all identification 
and estimation was done using a 90-day trading window. It is striking that most of 
the identified periods coincide with significant events or news related to the particu-
lar stock. First we discuss the results for Ceske Radiokomunikace (CRA), which was 
removed from the market in September 2004, although the decision on removal had 
to be made in 2003. Therefore, our results that MM4 behaved significantly different-
ly from other MMs in the second half of 2003 may suggest that he cooperated with 
some large informed customer who had better information about the buyout of CRA.  
Similarly, the results for Telefonica O2 resonate with its privatization, indicat-
ing that some investors may have been aware of the privatization results and traded 
on this information ahead of time (see Figure 2 for a graphical summary of the test: 
MM7, afternoon). A further example of coincidence with important news is the result 
for CEZ. As we already mentioned, during 2008 the Czech government was selling 
nearly 7% of the shares and our results confirm that part of the trade was done using 
 
20 If the quote is the best available on the market and if some investor reacts to it, the market maker is
obliged to execute the trade. 
21 We should point out that the difference does not imply that the market maker is an insider, as he may be
processing a large trade order or using dual trading, which is not illegal in the Czech Republic.  
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Table 7a  Extent of Information-Driven Trading Originating from the Behavior 
of Informed Market Makers 
Stock Time  period  morning/




0.263 0.352 0.088 
2.46 0.014 




0.253 0.336 0.083 
2.28 0.022 




0.176 0.368 0.193 
3.69 0.000 




0.239 0.338 0.100 
2.43 0.015 




0.550 0.784 0.234 
2.00 0.045 




0.344 0.248 0.097 
2.22 0.027 




0.268 0.301 0.033 
2.35 0.019 




0.300 0.346 0.046 
2.06 0.039 




0.570 0.642 0.072 
3.30 0.001 




0.362 0.461 0.100 
2.48 0.013 





0.301 0.371 0.069 
3.79 0.000 





0.399 0.507 0.107 
3.43 0.001 





0.407 0.584 0.177 
2.90 0.004 





0.466 0.598 0.132 
3.22 0.001 





0.510 0.586 0.076 
2.07 0.038 
22.4.2010 (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.037) 
Note: PIMM is the estimate of information-driven trading using the sum of buys and sells excluding the buys 
and sells of a given market maker. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: authors’ computations 
MM4’s market-making activities. Also, the other results for CEZ are connected with 
important news – during summer 2009 the  Czech parliament approved a  law on 
the distribution of free carbon dioxide permits for firms including CEZ.  
Another example of important news that coincides with our results is the in-
formation about NWR buying a 25% share in Ferrexpo late in 2008. In the case of 
CME, the uncertain outlook of the firm after the financial crisis and mainly the infor-
mation about Warner Brothers buying a 31% share in CME is also sufficiently im-
portant news to have possibly large orders traded through MM1 during the spring and 
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Table 7b  Extent of Information-Driven Trading Originating from the Behavior 
of Informed Market Makers 
Stock Time  period  morning/




0.611 0.754 0.143 
2.55 0.011 




0.459 0.562 0.103 
2.40 0.016 




0.415 0.541 0.127 
2.01 0.045 




0.418 0.531 0.113 
3.10 0.002 




0.485 0.638 0.152 
3.50 0.000 




0.527 0.658 0.131 
3.89 0.000 




0.380 0.459 0.080 
2.63 0.008 




0.434 0.528 0.095 
2.79 0.005 




0.466 0.570 0.103 
3.02 0.003 




0.390 0.472 0.082 
2.38 0.017 




0.438 0.510 0.072 
2.09 0.037 




0.449 0.556 0.107 
2.03 0.043 




0.344 0.485 0.141 
2.00 0.046 




0.464 0.652 0.188 
2.32 0.020 




0.572 0.682 0.109 
2.06 0.039 
22.4.2009  (0.073) (0.076) (0.053) 
Note: PIMM is the estimate of information-driven trading using the sum of buys and sells excluding the buys 
and sells of a given market maker. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: authors’ computations 
summer of 2009. The financial crisis and the collapse of capital markets decreased 
the traded volume and therefore also increased the effect of every larger order on 
the price of the assets. This, together with speculation about whether ORCO would 
survive its financial problems, might stand behind our results of the significantly dif-
ferent behavior of MM5, MM1, and MM7 during 2009–2010 for ORCO.  
Overall, the  results confirm the  perception that a  high percentage of block 
trades (around 30%) or large orders might have a significant impact on the behavior 
of some MMs, as you can see on the results for CEZ, Komercni banka, and Phillip 
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Table 8  Extent of Information-Driven Trading Before and After Changing the Lot Size 
Stock  Date  LOT 1  LOT 2  morn/ 
/aft  PIN 1  PIN 2  Diff  T-stat  P-value 
CEZ 15.10.04 20,000 10,000 
morn 
0.462 0.352 0.110 
1.52 0.128 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.072) 
aft 
0.517 0.416 0.101 
1.55 0.120 
(0.042) (0.032) (0.065) 
CEZ 12.8.05  10,000 5,000 
morn 
0.333 0.232 0.101 
2.24 0.025 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.045) 
aft 
0.428 0.332 0.096 
1.48 0.139 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.065) 
EB 19.9.03  500 1,000 
morn 
0.376 0.349 0.027 
0.47 0.636 
(0.043) (0.037) (0.057) 
aft 
0.500 0.521 -0.021 
0.25 0.802 
(0.061) (0.048) (0.084) 
EB 12.3.04  1,000 500 
morn 
0.384 0.362 0.022 
0.33 0.744 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.066) 
aft 
0.538 0.434 0.104 
1.29 0.197 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.080) 
KB 5.9.03  2,000  1,000 
morn 
0.523 0.352 0.171 
3.02 0.003 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.057) 
aft 
0.575 0.446 0.130 
1.95 0.051 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.066) 
KB 30.6.08  1,000 500 
morn 
0.310 0.281 0.029 
0.80 0.426 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.036) 
aft 
0.367 0.266 0.100 
1.79 0.073 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.056) 
PM 12.3.04  200  100 
morn 
0.741 0.498 0.243 
2.68 0.007 
(0.040) (0.037) (0.091) 
aft 
0.713 0.489 0.225 
3.20 0.001 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.070) 
UNI 24.2.05  20,000  10,000 
morn 
0.476 0.334 0.142 
2.23 0.025 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.064) 
aft 
0.380 0.278 0.102 
1.45 0.148 
(0.060) (0.059) (0.070) 
ZEN 29.6.07  3,000 2,000 
morn 
0.287 0.278 0.009 
0.21 0.837 
(0.032) (0.044) (0.043) 
aft 
0.299 0.144 0.154 
1.93 0.054 
(0.037) (0.061) (0.080) 
Note:  The table shows the extent of information-driven trading within 90 trading days before and after 
a change in the lot size. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: authors’ computations 
Morris during 2003–2005. Although the  percentage of block trades decreased re-
markably in 2006, the behavior of MMs probably did not change, as the SPAD trades 
with no identification experienced a significant increase at the same time. Our results  
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suggest that even though market participants might be aware of the different behavior 
of several MMs, they are not able to compete with them due to superior information 
coming, for example, from detailed information about large orders.  
Finally, we focused on the effect of changes in the trading lot size on trading be-
havior and on PIN. As we already mentioned, changing the lot size may affect the ex-
tent of information-driven trading, as informed traders are more likely to trade larger 
volumes. Smaller lot volumes might attract more uninformed investors. The  esti-
mation and test results are summarized in Table 8.  
As we can see, most of the changes in the lot size significantly affected the ex-
tent of information-driven trading, as lot breakups attracted more retail and therefore 
uninformed investors. Overall, a smaller lot size means more trades with the partic-
ular stock, higher attractiveness for individual investors, and a lower extent of PIN. 
The exception is Erste bank (EB), whose shares did not significantly react to either 
an increase or decrease in the lot size. In terms of information-driven trading, this is 
still consistent, since the primary market of EB is the Vienna Stock Exchange and 
trading in Prague is much smaller compared to its main market. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the  behavior of MMs and the  ability to maintain 
private information about large orders. We propose an automatic procedure using 
order flows to detect and test specific positions of particular MMs in an electronic 
dealers market. Trading data with one side of the mandatory buy/sell trade orders 
identified are used to demonstrate our method. 
We found significant differences in behavior among MMs on the Prague Stock 
Exchange, supporting the  perception that they play a  dominant role in affecting 
the price for a short time interval as well as for a longer period. Although the other 
participants in the market may be aware that some of the MMs might possess private 
information about the value of the asset, they are not able to reveal the full informa-
tion. Further, our analysis confirms that important changes such as decreasing the vol-
ume of the trading lot may affect (decrease) the extent of order flow information- 
-driven trading.  
From the  trading perspective it could be understood that on a  thin market 
MMs should be somehow protected to be able to maintain private information about 
their sizable (block) orders and be able to face the threats of predatory trading and 
increased volatility during such trades. Nevertheless, the current practice of MMs in 
the Prague Stock Exchange could threaten minority and uninformed investors be-
cause prices can then no longer convey all relevant information. This observation 
leads to the conclusion that further regulation might be beneficial. However, the op-
timal policy from the regulatory point of view is not so straightforward and is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. From our estimation it is clear, though, that increased 
regulation by introducing so-called trading books (detailed recording of all trades 
conducted) for each broker does not help. As we mentioned (forbidden) block trades 
were basically transformed into SPAD trades with missing party identification. This 
might suit some of the large institutional players, but we believe that it results in 
a less transparent market with lower trading volume and lower informational content. 
All of these results could be harmful, especially on a market with a significant pres- 
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ence of foreign investors. This raises the question about introducing an upstairs mar-
ket (similar to the NYSE, for example), a transparent trading segment that would 
serve institutional investors, and keeping a variant of SPAD with smaller lot size 
suitable for small individual investors. It is clear from our results that an appropriate 
(i.e., much smaller) trading lot size would reduce the amount of information-driven 
trading and would also increase the trading volume and attract small individual in-
vestors. 
In general, given that this study uses an automatic procedure, has only modest 
assumptions, and includes a  model that is relatively easy to use, we believe that 
the methodology in this paper could be used by investors as well as regulatory au-
thorities on emerging markets to identify unusual order flows and/or suspicious 
behavior by particular market participants. 
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